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C.: Date From Which Interest Accrues on Judgment in Tort
EDITORIAL NOTES

West Virginia Supreme Court would hold that a joint judgment
could be taken 'against a survivor in his own right and a substituted trustee, where the substitution is made necessary by death
of the jointly contracting original trustee. Such a judgment
would be against parties in different capacities. Practically, the
procedural difficulties ought not to be any greater in the case of
a personal representative than in the case of a substituted trustee.

-L.C.

DATE FROx WHICH INTEREST ACCRUES ON JUDGMENT IN TORT.The Supreme Court of Appeals in a recent case has removed some
confusion that has confronted the bench and bar on the subject of
the date from which interest is computed in entering up judgment
in a tort action. At least we have the last unmistakable utterance
of a majority of the court. There is a dissenting opinion on this
question by one judge. 2 This decision follows one rendered about
a year previously,3 in which the court divided exactly as in the
'Wehrle v. Wheeling Traction Company, 102 S. E. 289 (1920), decided January 27,
1920 (rehearing denied March 24. 1920), In which it is said: "In the recent care
of Long v. Pocahontas Consolidated Collieries Co., 83 W. Va. 380, 98 S. E. 289,
Judge Williams dissenting, we Ignored the ruling in the Easter Case on this question of interest, and in reversing the judgment below in a tort action rendered
judgment for the plaintiff with interest from the date of the verdict. In the
Easter Case we seem to have been misled by Talbott v. W. Va. C. & P. Ry. Co.,
42 W. Va. 560, opinion by Judge Holt, decided subsequently to the amendment.
of sections 14, 16 and 18 of chapter 131 of the Code, by chapter 120 Acts of the
Legislature, 1882, and to have overlooked our decision in Campbell s,. City of
Elkins, 58 W. Va. 308. As Judge Holt in Talbott v. W. Va. C. & P. Ry. Co. ]refers only to Hawker v. B. & 0. R. R. Co., supra, and Murdocld v. Insurance Co.,
33 W. Va. 407, the latter case Involving a judgment rendered after, but a verdict
rendered before said amendments, he seems to have overlooked the effect of the
amendments of 1882. In Campbell v. City of Elkins, due regard seems to have
been had to the amendments of 1382, and the conclusion there reached that In
tort actions like the present the Judgment should bear interest from the date of
the verdict, as provided in seation 16 of chapter 131, the only provision of the
law applicable in such cases. After a full review of these decisions, we are fully
satisfied that In actions of tort the Juudgment should bear interest from the date of
the verdict."
'Wehrle v. Wheeling Traction Company, 102 S. E. 289 (1920), where, in the dissenting opinion of Judge Williams it is said:
"I dissent from so much only of
the foregoing opinion as holds that Interest on the judgment should run from
the date of the verdict, for the same reason expressed In my dissenting opinion
in the Long p. Pocahontas Consolidated Collieries Case 83 W. Va. 380, 98 S. E.
289. Properly construed, I do not think the statute cited In the opinion applies to
judgments recovered in tort actions."
3Long v. Pocahontas Consol. Collieries Co., 83 W. Va. 280, 98 S. E. 289 (1919).
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first mentioned ease.' The case in which the decision of a year
previously was rendered came before the court on'a writ of error
awarded to the plaintiff to review the judgment of the circuit court
in setting aside the verdict of the jury in the plaintiff's favor and
granting the defendant a new trial. The court, holding that the
plaintiff should have had judgment, proceeded to give judgment
for the amount found by the verdict "with interest from ......
the date of the verdict." In doing so, although without expressly
mentioning it either in the syllabus or opinion, so that digesters
and the profession generally would take note thereof, a former
decision, of some four years' standing was overuled. In the
case last referred to the court reversed a judgment of the circuit
court awarding interest from the date of verdict, and entered
judgment carrying interest from the date of the judgment in the
'Long v. Pocahontas Consol. Collieries Co., 83 W. Va. 380, 98 S. E. 289 (1919),
Judge Williams, in his dissenting opinion, said:
"I do not concur in so mucl,
of the opinion as holds that plintiff is entitled to Interest from the date of the
verdict.
"This is a tort action, and there is no povision in the statute for allowing interest in such cases prior to the date of the judgment. Sections 14 and 16 of
chapter 131 (sees. 4923, 4925) Code of West Virginia, relate only to actions ez
contractu, hence the amendment of those sections in 1882, so as to allow interest
from the date of the verdict, did not change the rule as to interest in actions
ex delicto. The cases of Hawker v. B. & 0. R. R. Co., 15 W. Va. 628, 36 Am.
Rep. 825, -and Fowler v. B. & 0. R. R. Co.. 18 W. Va. 579, are binding authority
notwithstanding the subsequent amendment of the statute. Talbott v. W. Va. C. & P.
Ry. Co., 42 W. Va. 560, 26 S. E. 311, and Easter v. Virginian Ry. Co., 76 W.
Va. 383, 86 S. E. 37. Campbell v.. City of Elkins, 58 W. Va. 308, 52 S. E. 220, 2
L. R. A. (N. S.) 159, conflicts with the foregoing, but the opinion does not mention
the Talbott Case, which was decided after the statute was amended."
3Easter v. Virginian Ry. Co., 76 W. Va. 38, 86 S. 3, 37 (1915), in which It Is
said on this question, in the majority opinion: "The verdict was endered on the
3d of September, 1913, and the court did not enter judgment thereon until the
13th of May, 1914, and then rendered judgment for the amount of the verdict, with
interest thereon from the date of the verdict.
This is assigned as error. Section 18, c. 131, Code 1913 (sec. 4927), provides as follows:
'Every judgment or decree for the payment of money, except where it is
otherwise provided, by law, shall bear interest from the date thereof, whether
it be so stated in the judgment or decree or not.'
"Section 14 (see. 4923) of the same chapter authorizes a judgment for interest
from the date of the verdict only in case of actions founded on contract. The
judgment in the present case being for a tort, there is no authority in law for
giving judgment for interest, except from the date of the judgment. The judgment would bear interest from that date, whether it so stated or not. Talbott
,v. W. Va. etc. R. Co., 42 W. Va. 560, 26 S. E. 311; Fowler v. B. & 0. R. Co
18 W. Va. 579; and Hawker v. B. & 0. R .Co., 15 W. Va. 629, 36 Am. Rep. 825."
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circuit court. To this action there was dissent.' But even this
decision was in the face of a contrary one rendered some ten years
earlier,7 which neither the majority nor dissenting opinion mentioned, holding that since the amendments of 1882 a judgment
in a tort action should carry interest from date of verdict. This
decision, too, overruled, without referring thereto, a former deGEaster v. Virginian Ry. Co., 76 W. Va. 383, 86 S. E. 37 (1915), in which, in the
dissenting opinion. Judge Poffenbarger said: "I would not reverse the judgment
for inclusion of interest on the verdict.
Section 18 of chapter 131 (see. 4927)
of the Code does not pertain to the question at all. It merely gives interest on
judgments and decrees, whether they specifically provided for it or not, in all
cases in which the law does nQt expressly withhold or deny it.
No limitation
thereof to judgments in actions ex delicto can be found in its terms. It deals
with judgments and decrees. There axe no decrees in causes ex delicto. Section
16 (see. 4925), of the chapter gives interest from the date of the verdict, if there
he one, in all judgments for the payment of money. This is such a judgment
The reference to principal does not limit the application to judgments in cases
arising out of contract. The verdict is the principal sum, the amount on which
Interest is to be computed, except in those cases in which there happens to be
a bond or other obligation calling for payment of money. Section 14 (see. 4923),
giving interest on the aggregate of principal and interest from the date of the
verdict, covers all actions founded on contract.
Section 16 ,(sec. 4925) means
something more.
It says when there is a recovery on a bond conditioned for
the payment of money, as well as in all cases where a judgment or decree is
rendered or made for the payment of money, it shall be for the aggregate of
principal and interest due at the date of the verdict, if there be one, with interest
thereon from such date."
. 'Campbell v. City of Elkins, 58 W. Va. 308, 52 S. E. 220 (1805), in which the
court said on this question: "As the verdict was rendered May 8, 1903, the subsequent rendition of judgment for the amrnit thereof with interest from the date
of the verdict was in strict obedience to the mandate of the statute. Code 1899,
c. 131, see. 16. Prior to Acts 1882, p. 341, c. 120, amending certain sections of
the Code, including sections 14 and 16, this would have been error. Fowler v.
Railroad Co., 18 W. Va. 579. But the act of 1882 amended the chapter so as to
make it say, in section 14, judgment shall be entered 'with interest from the date
of the verdict,' instead of 'from the date of the Judgment,' as in the Code of
1868, and, in'section 16, for the aggregate of principal and interest due at the
date of the verdict if there be one, otherwise at the date of the judgment or decreoe
with interest thereon from such date, In all cases as to which it is not otherwise
provided. 'Such date' means the date of the verdict when there is one and ithe date
of the judgment or decree when there is no verdict. This is the plain, logical, as
well as grammatical, connection and meaning of the words. Fowler v. R. IL Co.,
cited, and Hawker v. Railroad Co., 15 V. Va. 628, 36 Am. Rep. 825, assert that
actions for damages are ruled by the two sections above referred to, and, as they have
been amended so as to give interest from the date of the verdict instead of the date of
the judgment, these two cases sustain the interpretation of the statute herein expressed."

$ACTS or W. VA. 1882, c. 120.
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cision rendered some nine years earlier,9 though subsequent to
the amendments of 1882, of the opposite conclusion. Prior to
1882 the court had passed upon the question twice,10 holding that
a judgment in a tort action should carry interest only from its
date. Another ease controlled by the law prior to 1882 is also

OTalbott v. West Virginia C. & P. Ry. Co., 42 W. Va. 560, 26 S. E. 311 (1896),
In which It was said: "If this had been an action on contract, then section 14
of chapter 131 of the Code requires that the jury should have found the aggregate of principal and interest due at the time of the trial, and that the Judgment
should have been entered for such aggregate, with interest from the date of the
verdict. But this action being for a tort, and not on contract, judgment should
have been rendered for the sum found to bear interest from the date thereof,
as required by section 18 of chapter 131 of the Code. In this case the judgment was, in violation of this statute, rendered for the sum found........
and
interest

. . .

from

.

.

..

the date

of the verdict.

This was

error.

See

Hawker v. Railroad Co., 15 W. Va. 628; Murdock v. Insurance Co., 33 W. Va.
407, 10 S. E. 777."
"Fowler v,. B. & 0. R. R. Co.. 1S W. Va. 579 (1881), in which it is said: "But
the circuit court committed manifest error In giving judgment for interest from
the date of the verdict. in an action for damages the judgment should be for
the amount assessed by the Jury and interest on this amount from the day the
judgment is actually rendered, and not from the date of the verdict. Hawker V.
B. & 0. R. R. Co., 15 W. Va. 628."
Hawker v. B. & 0. R. R. Co., 15 W. Va. 628 (1879), in which it is said: "The
'court also erred in giving judgment for interest on damages found by the jury
prior to the day the judgment was actually entered, that Is, the 7th day of May,
1878. The Judgment entered by the circuit court erroneously gave interest from
the first day of the term at which the judgment was entered, that is, from April
18, 1878. The 18th section of chapter 131 of the Code of W. Va. page 628 provides that every judgment or decree for the payment of moneay except when It
Is otherwise provided by law, shall bear Interest from the date thereof. If this
'ection stood alone it might perhaps be argued that as a judgment or decree, whanever rendered, for some purposes is regarded as though it were rendered on the
first day of the term, this Interest should be under this statute from the first
day of the term. But the 14th section of the same chapter page 627 showe
clearly that this was not the meaning of the law; for this section provides
that in an action on a contract the jury may allow interest on the principal due, or any part thereof, and in all cases shall find the aggregate of the
principal and interest due st the time of the trial, and judgment shall be entered
thereon with interest from the date of the judgment This obviously does not mean
with interest from the first day of the term; for the jury had already been directed to aggregate the principal and interest to a day, which must generally be
subsequent to the first day of the term. Its meaning Is obviously that the Judgment shall be with interest from the day it is actually rendered; and we must
construe the same word in the 18th section to have the same meaning, that Is,
the judgment in any action, unless it is otherwise provided by law, should bear
interest only from the day it is actually entered of record."
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cited in these cases," but it was not an action of tort. The controversy therefore hinges, it seems. on the effect of the amendments
of 1882.
The West Virginia Code,"2 as it has stood since the amendments
of 1882, clearly allows interest from date of verdict in actions ex
contractu and recoveries on bonds, and the crux of the controversy
lies in the fact whether the words, in section 16, "as well as in alt
cases where a judgment or decree is rendered or made for the
payment of money, it [the recovery] shall be for the aggregate of
principal and interest due at the date of the verdict if there be
one, otherwise at the date of the judgment or decree, with interest
thereon from such date, except in cases where it is otherwise provided," are intended to include actions ex delicto. The history of
the statute, sections 14 and 16, would seem to say not, and to be
opposed to the final conclusion of the court. The Code of Virginia of 1849,13 continued by the Code of 1860, allowed the jury
to give interest in a tort aetion, as well as in an action on contract,
2

This was
" Murdock v. Franklin Ins. Co., 33 W. Va. 407, 10 S. E. 777 (1889).
not a tort action, but one of covenant on an maurpnce policy. The question was
whether the Judgme.t should bear interest from date, or whether interest should
run from date of verdict. The action was Instituted in 1868, and the verdict was
rendered in 1873, and Judgment thereon In 1887. In the meantime Chapter 120,
Acts 1.882. amending Code of W. Va. 1868, ch. 131, was passed, and it was held
that the law in force (Code of W. Va. 1868, ch. 131, sec. 14) at the time of the
verdict governed and allowed interest only from date of judgment, the amendatory
itatute not being retrospective.
See, also, Baer's Sons Grocer Co. v. Cutting Fruit-Packing Co., 42 W. Va. 359,
26 S. E. 191 (1896).
32W. vA. ConE, c. 131 (as amended by AcTs, 1882, c. 120):
"Sec. 14. The jury in any action founded on contract. may allow interest on the
principal due, or any part thereof, and in all cases they shall find the aggregate
of principal and interest due at the time of the trial, after allowing all credits,
payments and set-oils, and judgment shall be entered for such aggregate with interest from the date of the verdict.
"Sec. 16. When there is a recovery on a bond conditioned for the payment of
money, as well as in all cases where a judgment or decree is rendered or made
for the payment of money, it shall be for the aggregate of principal and interest
due at the date of the verdict if there be one, otherwise at the date of the judgment or decree, with interest thereon from such date, except in cases where It Is
otherwise provided.
"See. 18. Every judgment or decree for the payment of money, except where
It Is otherwise provided by law, shall bear interest from the date thereof, whether
It be so stated in the judgment or decree or not."
22
CoDFs OF VA., 1849 and 1860. c., 177, are identical for the following sections:
"14. The jury, In any action founded on contract, may allow interest on the
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and to fix the period at which the interest should commence, and
provided that the judgment should carry interest from the date
so fixed or from the date of verdict.' 4 Prior to the taking effect
principal due, or any part thereof, and fix the period at which such Interest shall
commence. And in any action for a cause arising hereafter, whether from contract or from tort, the jury may allow interest on the sum found by the verdict,
or any part thereof, and fix the period at which the said interest shall commence.
if a verdict be rendered hereafter which does not. allow interest, the sum thereby
found shall bear interest from its date, whether the cause. of action arose heretofore, or shall arise hereafter, and judgment shall be entered accordingly.
"16. When there is a recovery on a bond, conditioned for the payment of
money, the judgment shall be for the penalty of the bond, to be discharged by
the payment of the principal, and the interest due thereon.
"18. In any suit in equity, or in an action founded' on contract, where no
jury is impanneled, judgment or decree may be rendered for interest on the principal sum recovered, until such principal be paid; and where there is a jury
which allows interest, the judgment shall in like manner be for such interest
until payment."
"Hepburn v. Dundas, 12 Gratt. 219 (Va. 1856).
This was an action of ejectment brought before the Code of 1849 was enacted. The court said: "The damages
claimed and allowed are for a tort, for the trespass and ejectment alleged, prior to the
1st of July 1850, when the Code of 1849 became the law. The statute, ch. 177,
see. 14, p. 673, permits a jury to give interest on dsmages for tort arising after
that lav, took effect; but leaves damages for tort theretofore .committed as they
formerly were; that is, bearing no interest. The usual and proper course for
juries in cases of this kind has been to consider the amount of interest, and
allow it as damages, but not as interest. Regarding the allowance of interest
made by the jury in this case as mere surplusage, the case is left under the operation of the second clause of sec. 14, which requires judgment to be given for Interest for money recovered in all cases from the date of the verdict, if no other
Lroper time be fixed. The judgment in this case must, therefore, be for interest
on the damages assessed from the 18th May 1853, the date of the verdict."
Lewis -v. Arnold, 13 Gratt. 454 (1856).
This was a tort action instituted In
1848. Verdict was rendered November 10th. 1852, and judgment was entered with
interest from that date. The question on writ of error was whether, under Code
of 1849, c. 177, s. 14, the judgment rightfully carried interest from date of
verdict, in view of the general repeal provisions of Code of 1849, e. 16, s. 18'
and c. 216, ss. 1 & 2.
In 'holding that c. 177, s. 14, was not affected by thl
general repeal provisions, the court baid: "The true point of objection (if any)
to the clau.e in question is, that it attaches to a cause of action already existing, a consequence which under the former law did not belong to it, the defendant
not being compellable by any former law in case of a verdict for damages assessed
in actions for tort, to pay interest thereon from the date of the verdict. But I
do not think that in th~is respect the clause stands in any respect opposed to the
spirit of these general regulations.
"No one who haa inflicted injury by the commission of a tort can be properly
said to have an established right to withhold for any space of time the measure
of reparation ascertined by the verdict of a jury to be due to the injured party.
The justice of requiring the prompt payment of the sum which may be assessed
by a Jury in such case, and of allowing the party injured to receive, and of compelling the party withholding to pay, a fair compensation for retaining it, it
just as clear as it is to make a similar requisition of one who is found to be
the debtor of another by contract. And when it is entirely within the power of
the wrongdoer wholly to avoid the new consequence which the clause in question
Lttaches to the verdict. (as it i,, by the prompt discharge of the damages,) I
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(July 1, 1850) of the Code of 1849, no judgment in a tort action
could carry interest from the date of verdict. 15 The statute prior
to that date covered only actions ex contractu.8 The present law
in 'Virginia still allows a judgment in a tort action to give interest from date of verdict.' 7 The law of Virginia that was in force
within the boundaries of the State of West Virginia when the
Constitution of 1863 was adopted became the law of West Virginia."' The statute contained in the Codes of 1849 and 1860, allowing interest from date of verdict in a tort action, therefore becannot see how the law can be said to be objectionable as being of a retrospective
character."
After pointing out that at the date of the CODeiOp 1849 the law allowed Juries
to give interest and fix the date at which it was to commence only in actions
founded on contract, the court continues.:
"In respect to actions founded on tort,
there was, at the date of the passage of the Code, no act of assembly either directing or forbidding the jury to allow interest on the damages, or prescribing
whether interest should or should not go on the damages assessed by the jury in
such cases, where the verdicts did not allow interest. These matters were regulated by the common law. In respect to them there was, therefore, no act of
assembly to be repealed; And consequently, the clause in question does not
come within the terms of the last chapter of the Code declaring the repeal of
'all acts and parts of acts' of a general nature.
"So far as the said clause declares a new rule in conflict with the common law,
it does so in terms definite and precise, leaving nothing for a general rule of construction to operate upon. It ascertains clearly the right to the interest as an incident to every- verdict to be thereafter rendered, which does not allow interest,
whether the cause of action arose theretofore or shall arise thereafter; makes no
distinction between suits pending or .thereafter to be brought; fixes .the date of
the verdict as the period from which the inierest is to run. and declaires that
judgment shall be rendered accordingly."
'-1Brugh v. Shanks, 5 Leigh, 598 (Va. 1833).
The court, in correcting the
judgments below, said: Carr, J.: "This interest, if the action had been founded
on contract, might have been given, but being founded, "wholly and clearly, in
tort, is unquestionably erroneous." And by Tucker, P.: "The jury had no right
to allow interest. It was not within its province or power. It has meddled with
a matter with which it had no concern."
Gibson v. The Governor, st the Relation of Stewart's Admr., 11 Leigh, 600
(Va. 1841): "This was an action of debt upon a sheriff's official bond to recover
damages sustained oy the relator by reason of a false return of vulla bona on a
I. fa. sued out by the relator. The court treated the action as one, in its real
nature, of tort, and held that "no interest on such damages (amount due upon
relator's execution at the return day thereof) should have been allowed by the
verdict, or given by the judgment of the court."
"1 Plv. Corm o VA., 1819, p. 508, c. 128, s. 80: "In all actions founded on
contracts, where judgment shall be rendered in court, if interest be allowed, such
Interest shall be upon the principal sum due. and shall continue until such principal sum be paid. And in all actions, founded on contracts, and tried before a
jury, the jury shall ascertain the principal sum due, and fix the period at which
interest shall commence, if interest be allowed by them; and judgment shall be
rendered accordingly, carrying on the interest till the Judgment shall be
satisfied."
1CODE O
VA., 1904, s. 3390; BxraKs PL.. 9-PR., 546; 4 M OR, INST., 2 ed.,
819. See also Pry v. Leslie, 87 Va. 269, 12 S. E. 671 (1891), where a Judgment
in an action of tort was amended because it failed to follow the statute in allowIng interest from the date of verdict.
13CONSTXTUTION OF WEST VRGINIA, 1863, Art. XI, a. 8.
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came the law of West Virginia. However, the first code adopted
by West Virginia, which became effective April 1, 1869, changed
the statute, 9 so that interest ran only from date of judgment.
This continued to be the law until the anindments of 1882. Those
amendments, with one other slight change, not material here,
changed sections 14 and 16 of chapter 131 of the Code to carry
interest from date of verdict instead of from date of judgment.
But does such amendment of section 16, by force of the expression
"in all cases," which had theretofore been in the statute, after
referring to recoveries on bonds, include actions "ex delicto? We
have already shown that the Supreme Court of Appeals has swung
back and forth on the proposition, finally answering in the affirmative. It may well be doubted whether this final construction is
correct: first, because the intent of the legislature seems not so to
be; and, secondly, construing the statute with reference to the
doctrine of ejusdem generis the effect of section 16 is limited.
If the Legislature, after having changed, by the Code of 1868,
the law contained in the Codes of 1849 and 1860, which included
actions ex delicto as well as ex contractr in allowing interest from
date of verdict, had intended to go back to the law as it existed
from 1850 to 1869, so as to allow interest from date of verdict,
it would, in all probability, have simply re-enacted the statute as
given by the Code of 1860. The law as contained in that Code, as
well as the present statute of Virginia, were prominent examples
expressly covering actions ex delicto. Further, section 16 of the
statute uses the words, "[the recovery] shall be for the aggregate of
principal and interest due at the date of verdict if there be one,
otherwise at the date of the judgment or decree." There is no
principal in a tort action; so the statute must refer to an action
where some instrument, in the nature of a bond, or a contract, or
another writing, or possibly a verbal agreement, calling for the
l"w. VA. CODE 1868, c. 131:
"14. The Jury, in any action founded on contract, may allow interest on the
principal due, or any part thereof, and in all cases they shall find the aggregote
of principal and interest due at the time of the trial, and judgment shall be en-

tered thereon with interest from the date of the judgment.
"16. When there is a recovery on a bond conditioned for the payment of
money, as well as in all cases where a judgment or decree is rendered or made
for the payment of money, it

shall be for the aggregate of principal and interest

due at-the date of the judgment or decree, with interest thereon from that date,
except in cases where it is otherwise provided.
"18. Every judgment or decree for the payment of money, 'except where it is
otherwise provided by law, shall bear interest from the date thereof, whether It
be so stated in the judgment or decree, or not"
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payment of money, is involved. In a tort action, too, there is almost without exception, a verdict; so from this view the Legislature did not intend to include tort actions. And is not such a construetion called for by the doctrine of ejvsdem generis?20 By
such doctrine the phrase "all cases," following reference to recoveries on bonds, should be held to mean "all like cases," or "all
cases of like kind or character." Section 16, during all of its complete history, from the Code of 1849 to the present, has, it seems,
referred and was intended to refer, to recoveries on bonds and
like instruments, and was not intended to be so broadened in its
meaning as to read "as well as in cases of every kind and character" interest shall be given in the judgment from the date of
verdict. And this notwithstanding that there seems to be, as
pointed out in an old Virginia case, 21 no good reason why a verdict in a tort action, as well as in an action on a contract, should
-J. R. C.
not bear interest from its date.
w36
CYC. 1119.

*'Lewis -o. Arnold.

See Notik 16, supra.
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